We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envyfreeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper-invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper-invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP.
Introduction
Consider the example of rationing [Elster, 1992] two types of divisible resources: food (F) and drink (D) among two families who have heterogeneous preferences over combinations of food and drink they wish to consume. For example, a family may prefer water with rice, and milk with wheat. How should we distribute available resources to the families fairly and efficiently?
In this paper, we consider the problem of divisible multitype resource allocation (MTRA) [Mackin and Xia, 2016] with partial preferences. Here, there are p ≥ 1 types of n divisible items per type, with one unit of supply of each item, and a group of n agents with partial preferences over receiving bundles consisting of one unit of each type. Our goal is to design mechanisms to fairly and efficiently allocate one unit of items of each type to every agent given their partial preferences over bundles.
Examples of our setting include the division of land and water resources [Segal-Halevi, 2017] . In cloud computing, agents have preferences over their share of how long they use combinations of computational resources such as CPU, memory, and storage [Ghodsi et al., 2011; Ghodsi et al., 2012; Grandl et al., 2015] . Partial preferences are natural in such problems since the number of bundles grows exponentially with the number of types, and it is often unreasonable to expect agents to form complete preferences over all bundles.
Unfortunately, it is well known that no mechanism which assigns each item fully to a single agent satisfies the basic fairness property of equal treatment of equals, meaning that everything else being equal, agents with the same preferences should receive the same share of the resources. For example, whenever two agents have equal and strict preferences over items, it is easy to see that no such mechanism satisfies equal treatment of equals.
Fractional mechanisms overcome this impossibility and possess more favorable properties. Indeed, the random priority (RP) [Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998 ] and probabilistic serial (PS) [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ] mechanisms are two well-known fractional mechanisms for single-type resource allocations which satisfy equal treatment of equals as well as different notions of fairness and efficiency. RP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, weak-sd-envy-freeness, and sdstrategyproofness, PS is sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and weaksd-strategyproof [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] . PS is the only mechanism that simultaneously satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and bounded invariance [Bogomolnaia and Heo, 2012; Bogomolnaia, 2015] . Following in this vein, we focus on the class of fractional mechanisms adapted to MTRAs and partial preferences, whose output allocates fractional shares of bundles to the agents.
Our work is the first to consider the design of fair and efficient mechanisms for MTRAs with partial preferences, and the first to extend fractional mechanisms to MTRAs and partial preferences, to the best of our knowledge. Katta and Sethuraman [2006] mention that PS can be extended to partial orders but we are not aware of a followup work. Monte and Tumennasan [2015] and Mackin and Xia [2016] consider the problem of MTRA under linear preferences, but do not fully address the issue of fairness. Ghodsi et al. [2011] consider the problem of allocating multiple types of resources, when the resources of each type are indistinguishable, and agents have different demands for each type of resource. However, the problem of finding fair and efficient assignments for MTRA with partial preferences remains open.
Our mechanisms output fractional assignments, where each agent receives fractional shares of bundles consisting of Table 1 : Properties of MRP and MPS under different domain restrictions on partial preferences. A "Y" indicates that the row mechanism satisfies the column property, and an "N" indicates that it does not. Results annotated with † are from [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] , ‡ are from [Hashimoto et al., 2014] . The rest are results proved in this paper. an item of each type, which together amount to one unit per type. In settings such as cloud computing, agents' consumption at any point in time must consist of a bundle composed of every type of item simultaneously at the same rate. The fractional assignments output by our mechanisms also specify for each agent how to form bundles for consumption from the assigned fractional shares of items. Our setting may be interpreted as a special case of cake cutting [Procaccia, 2013] , where the cake is divided into parts of unit size of p types, and n parts per type, and agents have complex combinatorial preferences over being assigned combinations of parts of the cake which amount to a unit of each type. Our Contributions. Our work is the first to provide fair and efficient mechanisms for MTRAs, and the first to extend PS and RP both to MTRAs and to partial preferences, to the best of our knowledge. We propose MPS and MRP as extensions of PS and RP to MTRAs respectively. Our main message is positive: Under the well-known and natural domain restriction of CP-net preferences [Boutilier et al., 2004a] , MRP and MPS satisfy all of the fairness and efficiency properties of their counterparts for single types and complete preferences.
Mechanism and Preference Domain SE EPE OF SEF WSEF UI SS WSS
Our technical results are summarized in Table 1 . We extend stochastic dominance to compare two fractional assignments under partial preferences. Here, a fractional assignment A is said to stochastically dominate another assignment B w.r.t. an agents' partial preferences, if at any bundle, the fractional share of weakly dominating bundles in A is larger than the fractional shares of more preferred bundles in B according to her preferences.
For the unrestricted domain of general partial preferences, unfortunately, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency (SE) and sd-envy-freeness (SEF) as we prove in Proposition 2. Despite this impossibility result, MRP and MPS retain several of the properties of their counterparts RP and PS: We show in Theorem 1 that MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency (EPE), weak-sd-envy-freeness (WSEF), weak-sd-strategyproofness (WSS), and in Theorem 2 that MPS is sd-efficient (SE) and weak-sd-envy-free (WSEF).
Remarkably, we recover the fairness and efficiency properties of MPS and the truthfulness and invariance properties for MRP and MPS under the well-known and natural domain restriction of CP-net preferences [Boutilier et al., 2004a] . We show in: -Theorem 3, that MRP is sd-strategyproof (SS), -Theorem 4, that MPS satisfies sd-envy-freeness (SEF) and ordinal fairness (OF), and -Proposition 4 that MPS is upper-invariant (UI), and in Proposition 5 that MPS satisfies weak-sd-strategyproofness (WSS) under the special case where agents' CP-nets share a common dependency structure.
At a high level, in MRP and MPS, agents consume their favorite bundle for which all items are still available at any point in time, until the supply of an item in the bundle is exhausted, instead of their favorite item as they would in RP and PS. Our proofs for sd-efficiency and weak-sd-strategyproofness of MPS rely on non-trivial extensions of the techniques used in [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] , and a careful analysis of the consumption of bundles.
Related Work and Discussion
We are not aware of any previous works which extend RP and PS to MTRAs. MTRAs belong to a long line of research on mechanism design for multi-agent resource allocation (see [Chevaleyre et al., 2006] for a survey), where the literature focuses on the settings with a single type of items. Mackin and Xia [2016] characterize serial dictatorships for MTRA by strategyproofness, neutrality, and non-bossiness. The exchange economy of multi-type housing markets [Moulin, 1995] is considered in [Sikdar et al., 2018; Sikdar et al., 2017] under lexicographic preferences, while Fujita et al. [2015] consider the exchange economy where agents may consume multiple units of a single type of items under lexicographic preferences.
Our work is the first to extend RP and PS under partial preferences, to the best of our knowledge despite the vast literature on fractional assignments. The remarkable properties of PS has encouraged extensions to several settings. Hashimoto et al. [2014] provide two characterizations of PS: (1) by sdefficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and upper-invariance, and (2) by ordinal fairness and non-wastefulness. In [Heo, 2014; Hatfield, 2009] there is a single type of items, and agents have multi-unit demands. In [Saban and Sethuraman, 2014] , the supply items may be different, while agents have unit demand and are assumed to have lexicographic preferences. Other works extend RP and PS to settings where indifferences are allowed [Katta and Sethuraman, 2006; Heo and Yılmaz, 2015; Aziz et al., 2015; Hosseini and Larson, 2019] . Yilmaz [2009] and Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [2011] extend PS to the housing markets problem [Shapley and Scarf, 1974] . Bouveret et al. [2010] study the complexity of computing fair and efficient allocations under partial preferences represented by SCI-nets for allocation problems with a single type of indivisible items.
Compact Preferences
Compact preference representations are a common approach to deal with the preference formation and elicitation bottleneck faced in MTRAs, where the number of bundles grows exponentially with the number of types. CP-nets [Boutilier et al., 2004b] are perhaps the most well-studied and natural compact preference representation language allowing agents to express conditional (in)dependence of their preferences over combinations of different types. Sikdar et al.
[2017] design mechanisms for multi-type housing markets under lexicographic extensions of CP-nets. Several works assume that agents' CP-net preferences have a common dependence structure for group decision making (see [Lang and Xia, 2016] for a recent survey).
Preliminaries
A multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) [Mackin and Xia, 2016] , is given by a tuple (N, M, R). Here, (1) N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents. (2) M = D 1 ∪· · ·∪D p is a set of items of p types, where for each i ≤ p, D i is a set of n items of type i, and there is one unit of supply of each item in M . We use D = D 1 × · · · × D p to denote the set of bundles. (3) R = ( j ) j≤n is a preference profile, where for each j ≤ n, j represents the preference of agent j. Bundles. For any type i ≤ p, we use k i to refer to the k-th item of type i. Each bundle x ∈ D is a p-tuple, and we use o ∈ x to indicate that bundle x contains item o. We define T = {D 1 , . . . , D p }, and for any S ⊆ T , we define S = × D∈S D, and −S = T \ S. For any S ⊆ T ,Ŝ ⊆ T \ S, and any x ∈ S , y ∈ Ŝ , (x, y) denotes the bundles consisting of all items in x and y. For any S ⊆ T , D ∈ T \ S, and any x ∈ S, o ∈ D, (o, x) denotes the bundles consisting of o and the items in x. Partial Preferences and Profiles. A partial preference is a partial order over D which is an irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive binary relation. Given a partial preference over D, we define the corresponding preference graph denoted G to be a directed graph whose nodes correspond to the bundles in D, and for every x, y ∈ D, there is an directed edge (x, y) if and only if x y and there exists no z ∈ D such that x z and z y. We use R to denote the set of all possible preference profiles. We use −j to denote the preferences of agents in N \ {j}. Given a partial order over D, we define the upper contour set of at a bundle x ∈ D as U ( , x) = {x :x x orx = x}.
Acyclic CP-nets. A CP-net [Boutilier et al., 2004a] over the set of variables D is given by two components (i) a directed graph G = (T, E) called the dependency graph, and (ii) for each i ≤ p, there is a conditional preference table CP T (D i ) that contains a linear order x over D i for each x ∈ P a(Di) , where P a(D i ) is the set of types corresponding to the parents of D i in G. When G is (a)cyclic we say that is a (a)cyclic CP-net. The partial order induced by an acyclic CP-net over D is the transitive clo-
Figure 1: an acyclic CP-net and a general partial preference Example 1. Consider MTRA (N, M, R) with p ≥ 2 types where N = {1, 2}, M = {1 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 2 2 }, where 1 2 is item 1 of type 2 and so on. Let agent 1's preferences 1 be represented by the acyclic CP-net in Figure 1 , where the dependency graph (Figure 1 (a)) shows that her preference on type 2 depends on her assignment of type 1. The corresponding conditional preference tables (Figure 1 (b)) show that agent 1 prefers 1 2 with 1 1 , and she prefers 2 2 with 2 1 . This induces the preference graph in Figure 1 (c) which happens to be a linear order. Let agent 2's preferences 2 be represented by the preference graph in Figure 1 (d) which represents a partial order, where 1 1 2 2 is the least preferred bundle, and providing no information on the relative ordering of other bundles.
Assignments. A deterministic assignment A : N → D is a one to one mapping from agents to bundles such that no item is assigned to more than one agent. A fractional allocation shows the fractional shares an agent acquires over D, represented by a vector
We use Π to denote the set of all possible fractional allocations on an agent. A fractional assignment is a combination of all agents' fractional allocations, represented by a matrix P = [p j,x ] j≤n,x∈D , P ∈ [0, 1] |N |×|D| , such that (i) for every j ≤ n, x∈D p j,x = 1, (ii) for every o ∈ M , S o = {x : x ∈ D and o ∈ x}, j≤n,x∈So p j,x = 1. The j-th row of P represents agent j's fractional allocation under P , denoted P (j). We use P to denote the set of all possible fractional assignment matrices. If a fractional assignment matrix can be represented as a probability distribution over deterministic assignments, we say the matrix is realizable.
Mechanisms. A mechanism f : R → P is a mapping from profiles to fractional assignments. For any profile R ∈ R, we will use f (R) to refer to the fractional assignment matrix output by f , and for any agent j ≤ n and any bundle x ∈ D, we use f (R) j,x to refer to the value of the element of the matrix indexed by j and x.
Stochastic Dominance. We extend the notion of stochastic dominance [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ] to compare fractional assignments for MTRAs under partial preferences. Definition 1. (stochastic dominance) Given a partial preference over D, the stochastic dominance relation associated with , denoted sd is a weak ordering over Π such that for any pair of fractional allocations p, q ∈ Π, p stochastically dominates q, denoted p sd q, if and only if for every x ∈ D, x∈U ( ,x) px ≥ x∈U ( ,x) qx.
We write P sd j Q to denote P (j) sd j Q(j). We use P sd Q to indicate that P sd j Q for every j ≤ n and P = Q. Example 2. Consider the situation in Example 1 and the three matrices (1), (2), and (3) shown below. The four upper contour sets for agent 1 are {1 1 1 2 }, {1 1 1 2 , 1 1 2 2 }, {1 1 1 2 , 1 1 2 2 , 2 1 2 2 }, and {1 1 1 2 , 1 1 2 2 , 2 1 1 2 , 2 1 2 2 }. The consumptions of the four upper contour sets in matrix (2) for agent 1 are 0.5, 0.5, 1, 1 respectively and are 0, 0.5, 0.5, 1 in matrix (3). The former is greater than or equal to the latter respectively, and the same can be concluded for agent 2 by considering the upper contour sets {1 1 1 2 }, {2 1 2 2 }, {2 1 1 2 }, and {1 1 1 2 , 1 1 2 2 , 2 1 1 2 , 2 1 2 2 }. Hence matrix (2) stochastically dominates matrix (3). We can check that matrix (2) does not dominate matrix (1) and the reverse is true by considering the sets of {1 1 1 2 } and {2 1 1 2 } for agent 2.
(1)
Desirable Properties. A fractional assignment P satisfies: (i) sd-efficiency, if there is no fractional assignment Q = P such that Q sd P , (ii) ex-post-efficiency, if P can be represented as a probability distribution over sd-efficient deterministic assignments, (iii) sd-envy-freeness, if for every pair of agents j,ĵ ≤ n, P (j) sd j P (ĵ), (iv) weak-sdenvy-freeness, if for every pair of agents j,ĵ ≤ n, P (ĵ) sd j P (j) =⇒ P (j) = P (ĵ), and (v) ordinal fairness, if for every bundle x ∈ D and every pair of agents j,ĵ ≤ n with
A mechanism f satisfies X ∈ {sd-efficiency, ex-postefficiency, sd-envy-freeness, weak-sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness}, if for every R ∈ R, f (R) satisfies X. A mechanism f satisfies: (i) sd-strategyproofness if for every profile R ∈ R, every agent j ≤ n, every R ∈ R such that R = ( j , −j ), it holds that f (R) sd j f (R ), and (ii) weak-sd-strategyproofness if for every profile R ∈ R, every agent j ≤ n, every R ∈ R such that R = ( j , −j ), it holds that f (R )
Given any partial preferences , we denote | B by the restriction of to B ⊆ D, i.e., | B is a preference relation over B such that for all x, y ∈ B, x | B y ⇔ x y. Then for any j ≤ n, j is an upper invariant transformation of j at x ∈ D under a fractional assignment P if for some
. A mechanism f satisfies upper invariance if it holds that f (R)ĵ ,x = f (R )ĵ ,x for everŷ j ≤ n, j ≤ n, R ∈ R, R ∈ R, and x ∈ D, such that R = ( j , −j ) and j is an upper invariant transformation of j at x under f (R).
Extensions of RP and PS Mechanisms to MTRAs with Partial Preferences
We propose MRP (Algorithm 1) and MPS (Algorithm 2) as extensions of the RP [Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998 ] and PS [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ] mechanisms to MTRAs with partial preferences. Given an instance of MTRA with agents' partial preferences, MRP and MPS operate on a modified preference profile of strict preferences, where for every agent with partial preferences , an arbitrary deterministic topological sorting is applied to obtain a strict ordering over D, such that for any pair of bundles x, y ∈ D, x y =⇒ x y. Given a strict order obtained in this way, and remaining M , we use Ext( , M ) to denote the first available bundle in , which we refer to as the agents' favorite bundle. It is easy to see that no available bundle is preferred over Ext( , M ) according to . We now present MRP and MPS as Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 MRP
Input: An MTRA (N, M, R) Output: Assignment matrix P 1: For each j ≤ n, compute a linear ordering j corresponding to a deterministic topological sort of G j . 2: P ← 0 and M ← M . 3: Pick a random priority order over agents. 4: Successively pick a highest priority agent j * according to . x * ← Ext( j , M ) and set P j * ,x * ← 1. Remove j * , and remove all items contained by x * in M . 5: return P Given an instance of MTRA with agents' partial preferences, MRP fixes an arbitrary deterministic topological sorting of agents' preferences, and sorts the agents uniformly at random. Then agents get one unit of their favorite available bundle Ext( , M ) M turn by turn.
Given an instance of MTRA with agents' partial preferences, MPS involves applying the PS mechanism to a modified profile over D using an arbitrary deterministic topological sorting in multiple rounds as follows. In each round, each agent consumes their favorite available bundle by consuming each item in the bundle at a uniform rate of one unit of an item per type per unit of time, until one of the bundles being consumed becomes unavailable because the supply for one of the items in it is exhausted. Although MPS (or MRP) always form the same topological sorting given the same partial preferences, the output of MPS (or MRP) may be different for different topological sortings as Example 3 shows.
Algorithm 2 MPS
Input: An MTRA (N, M, R) Output: Assignment matrix P 1: For each j ≤ n, compute a linear ordering j corresponding to a deterministic topological sort of G j .
o is in top(j)}|.
5.2: progress
Consider the situation in Example 1, the topological sort of agent 1's preference is 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 but both 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 and 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 can be the topological sort of agent 2's preference. If the topological sort of agent 2 is the former, in MPS, agent 1 consumes 1 1 1 2 and agent 2 consumes 2 1 1 2 at the beginning. When they both consume 0.5 fraction, 1 2 is exhausted. 1 1 1 2 and 2 1 1 2 become unavailable. They turn to identify the next bundles in line 4. For example, the first two bundles 2 1 1 2 and 1 1 1 2 are unavailable for agent 2, so she turns to the third bundle 2 1 2 2 . Agent 1 turns to 1 1 2 2 . Then MPS goes to next round of consumption until all left items are exhausted at the same time. The result is shown in matrix (1) in Example 2. However, if the topological sort of agent 2 is the latter, agent 1 and agent 2 both get 0.5 of 1 1 1 2 and 0.5 of 2 1 2 2 as matrix (2) shows. It is easy to check that MRP has the same conclusion.
There is a unique best available bundle w.r.t. any acyclic CP-net preference, and remaining supply of items, which can be computed in polynomial time by induction on the types according to the dependency graph as we show in Proposition 1. This is an extension of the well-known result of Boutilier et al. [2004a] that there is a unique best bundle w.r.t. any acyclic CP-net.
T , and let be any acyclic CP-net over D. Then, there exists unique x ∈ D such that for every y = x ∈ D , x y.
We use T op( , M ) to denote the best available bundle in remaining M given an acyclic CP-net . Under the domain restriction of acyclic CP-net preferences, for any topological sorting algorithms, Ext( j , M ) is exact T op( j , M ) for any M and j ≤ n by Proposition 1. Therefore, we can remove line 1 and instead Ext( j , M ) with T op( j , M ) in MRP or MPS to save the time and space.
Properties of MRP and MPS under General
Partial Preferences Theorem 1. Given any partial preference profile R, MRP(R) is ex-post-efficient, weak-sd-envy-free, and weaksd-strategyproof.
For ex-post-efficiency, it is obvious that the first agent according to the priority order who has a different assignment does not have an improvement. We can prove weak-sd-envyfreeness of MRP by just exchanging the positions of two agents. For weak-sd-strategyproofness, if an agent wants a larger share of a bundle x, she has to sacrifice a bundle positioned over x in the topological order, which ultimately results in a smaller share of some bundle positioned over x in the topological order.
Remark 1. MRP is not upper invariant and sd-strategyproof under general partial preferences.
We offer an adaptable sufficient condition for a fractional assignment to be sd-efficient in Lemma 1 which we use in the proof of sd-efficiency of MPS. Before we proceed with the proofs, we introduce some notation. Given an assignment matrix P and a partial preference profile R, for any x,x ∈ D, (x,x) is an improvable tuple if there exists an agent j < n such that x jx and p j,x > 0. We use Imp(P, R) to denote the set of all the improvable tuples admitted by P at R. We use Imp(P ) for short when the preferences are clear from the context. The result by [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ] that an assignment matrix P is sdefficient if and only if the binary relation Imp(P ) has no cycle, fails to hold for MTRAs. As Example 2 shows, matrix (3) is sd-inefficient, but the set of the improvable tuples, {(1 1 1 2 , 1 1 2 2 ), (1 1 1 2 , 2 1 1 2 ), (1 1 2 2 , 2 1 1 2 ), (2 1 2 2 , 2 1 1 2 )}, has no cycle. Hence, Imp(P ) with no cycle is no longer the sufficient condition for the sd-efficiency of P . We provide such a sufficient condition in Lemma 1.
Definition 2. Given an assignment matrix P for an MTRA, a set C ⊆ Imp(P ) is a generalized cycle if it holds for every o ∈ M that: if there exists an improvable tuple (x 1 ,x 1 ) ∈ C such that o ∈ x 1 , then there exists a tuple (x 2 ,x 2 ) ∈ C, such that o ∈x 2 . Lemma 1. Given any partial preference profile R and assignment matrix P , P is sd-efficient if P admits no generalized cycle at R.
We prove Lemma 1 through a proof by contradiction which involves finding a generalized cycle in P if there exists an assignment matrix Q such that Q sd P , in Appendix.
Theorem 2. Given any partial preference profile R, MPS(R) is sd-efficient and weak-sd-envy-free.
We show that MPS(R) has no generalized cycle and prove the weak-sd-envy-freeness of MPS by induction on bundles under the topological order in Appendix.
Remark 2. MPS is not ex-post-efficient since its output may not be realizable when coming to multi-type resources. MPS is not ordinally fair, sd-envy-free and upper invariant under general partial preferences.
PS is both sd-efficient and sd-envy-free under linear preferences [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 ] but this is no longer true under general partial preferences, as the impossibility result in Proposition 2 shows. Proposition 2. No mechanism can satisfy both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness under general partial preferences.
A counterexample is available in Appendix.
Properties of MRP and MPS under Acyclic CP-net Preferences
For convenience, we refer to a profile of acyclic CP-net preferences as a CP-profile. Theorem 3. Given any CP-profile R, MRP(R) is sdstrategyproof.
Proof. Let P and P be the expected assignment matrices of MRP given the CP-profile R and R ∈ R such that R = ( j , −j ) for some j ≤ n. For an arbitrary fixed priority order, at any agent j's turn, the set of available bundles is the same under R and R . By Proposition 1, the best available bundle is also the same and unique. If j lies, she may get a smaller share of her best available bundle. Therefore, the result of a lie is stochastic dominated by the result of truthfulness. Since this is true for any fixed priority order, P is stochastic dominated by P .
Proposition 3. Given any CP-profile R, MRP(R) is upper invariant for any other CP-profile R .
Thanks to Proposition 1, given any upper invariant transformation at some y ∈ D, if y is available in the misreport agent's turn, she gets the same bundle despite her lie. Otherwise if y is unavailable, the lie does not affect her assignment. Next, we show that MPS satisfies two stronger notions of fairness under CP-profiles. Theorem 4. Given any CP-profile R, MPS(R) is sd-envyfree and ordinally fair.
Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove the case between agent 1 and agent 2. Let P = MPS(R). Let D 1 = {x ∈ D : P 1,x > 0} and n 1 = |D 1 |. By Proposition 1, we have an order over D 1 such that x 1 1 x 2 1 · · · 1 x n1 , x i ∈ D 1 for any i ≤ n 1 . For agent 2, we can define D 2 and n 2 and have an order over D 2 ,x 1 2x2 2 · · · 2xn2 , similarly.
(1) sd-envy-freeness. We need to prove P (1) y) . When agent 1 starts to consume x i+1 ,ŷ is unavailable for anyŷ ∈ U ( 1 , y). Otherwise by Proposition 1, we have x i+1 1ŷ or x i+1 =ŷ both indicating x i+1 ∈ U ( 1 , y), a contradiction. Suppose t(x i ) be the time when x i is exhausted and agent 1 starts to consume
(2) ordinal fairness. We need to prove x∈U ( 1,y) P 1,x ≤ x∈U ( 2 ,y) P 2,x for any y ∈ D 1 . For any x i ∈ D 1 , suppose that when x i is exhausted, agent 2 is consumingxî ∈ D 2 orxî is exhausted at the same time. If xî = x i , we have x∈U ( 1,xi) P 1,x = x∈U ( 2,xi) P 2,x . Ifxî = x i , since x i is available when agent 2 starts to consumexî, we havex k 2 x i for any k ≤î.
Therefore, for any y ∈ D with P 1,y > 0, we have x∈U ( 1,y) P 1,x ≤ x∈U ( 2,y) P 2,x .
Hashimoto et al. [2014] shows that ordinal fairness characterizes PS when we come to single-type resources. However, this is not the case in MTRAs: for example, if two agents' preferences are both as (c) in Figure 1 shows, the result that two agents both get 0.5 1 1 2 2 and 0.5 2 1 1 2 is ordinally fair but not the output of MPS. Next, we show the robustness of MPS. Proposition 4. Given any CP-profile R, MPS(R) is upper invariant for any other CP-profile R .
Given any upper invariant transformation at some y ∈ D, the consumptions are identical until y is exhausted whether the misreport agent is truthful or lies, by induction on the bundles consumed by the misreport agent under R. Details are in Appendix. Remark 3. MPS is not weak-sd-strategyproof under CP-net preferences.
MPS satisfies weak-sd-strategyproofness again under the stronger domain restriction of CP-profiles with a common dependency structure. Proposition 5. Given any CP-profile R with a identical dependency graph, MPS(R) is weak-sd-strategyproof for any other CP-profile R with the same dependency graph.
Suppose agent 1 is the misreport agent. If MPS(R ) 
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Given any acyclic CP-net , suppose the dependency graph in the CP-net is G. As G has no circle, there is D i1 ∈ T such that D i1 has no parent and there is o 1 in D i1 such that the agent prefers o 1 than any other item in D i1 . Then there is Proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 1. Given any partial preference profile R, MRP(R) is ex-post-efficient, weak-sd-envy-free, and weaksd-strategyproof.
Proof. (1) ex-post-efficiency. Given any priority order of agents in MRP, suppose P is the output. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an assignment matrix Q = P ∈ P such that Q sd P . Let j be the first agent in the set of agents who get different bundles between P and Q. Then, any bundle she gets in Q is available in her turn in MRP. Let x be the bundle agent j gets in P . Since Q sd P , there is a bundle y ∈ D such that y j x, Q j,y > 0 and y is available in agent j's turn. That is contradicted with that agent j gets x in her turn. Therefore, the result of MRP is sd-efficient for any fixed priority order. The expected result of MRP is the result by randomizing the agent orders, so it is the linear combination of some sd-efficient deterministic assignments.
(2) weak-sd-envy-freeness. W.l.o.g we only consider agent 1 and agent 2. Let assignment matrix P be the expected result of MRP. Suppose P (2) sd 1 P (1). We need to prove that P (2) = P (1).
Suppose the topological order of agent 1's preference in MRP is x 1 x 2 ... x n p . Let O be the set of any possible agent order, O 1 be the set of orders in which agent 1 is ranked in the front of agent 2 and O 2 be the set of orders in which agent 2 is ranked in the front of agent 1. It is obvious that
is the order that exchange the positions of agent 1 and agent 2 in o 1 . f is a one-to-one mapping and a surjection from O 1 to O 2 obviously.
We define the proposition F (x) as follow. For any o 1 ∈ O 1 , o 2 ∈ O 2 and f (o 1 ) = o 2 , either case (i) or case (ii) happens: (i) agent 1 gets x under o 1 or o 2 while agent 2 gets x under the other order; (ii) both agent 1 and agent 2 do not get x under o 1 and o 2 .
Then, we prove that F (x 1 ) is true. We consider two cases.
For any
If agent 2 gets x 1 under o 2 , x 1 is available for agent 1 under o 1 and agent 1 gets x 1 under o 1 .
2. For any o 1 ∈ O 1 , agent 1 is front of agent 2 and x 1 is the first bundle in topological order of agent 1's preference, so agent 2 has no chance to get x 1 under o 1 .
Based on the two cases above, we can conclude that p 2,x1 ≤ p 1,x1 . But P (2) sd 1 P (1) leads to p 2,x1 ≥ p 1,x1 . So p 2,x1 = p 1,x1 that induce that F (x 1 ) is true in addition to the two points above.
Next, supposing for any i < k (k ∈ {2, 3, ..., n p }), p 2,xi = p 1,xi and F (x i ) is true, we prove that p 2,x k = p 1,x k and F (x k ) is true. Consider the two cases again.
If agent 2 gets x k under o 2 , x k is available for agent 1 under o 1 . Besides, it means that agent 2 does not get The two cases above imply that p 2,x k ≤ p 1,x k .Since P (2) sd 1 P (1) and p 2,xi = p 1,xi for any i < k and
is true in addition to the two points above.
We have P (2) = P (1) by induction.
(3) weak-sd-strategyproofness. W.l.o.g Suppose agent 1 is the misreport agent. Let R = ( 1 , −1 ) and be the fixed topological order over 1 in MRP. Let assignment matrix P and P be the expected results of MRP under R and R . Suppose P sd 1 P . Assume for the sake of contradiction that P (1) = P (1). Let x 0 be the first bundle in such that P 1,x0 = P 1,x0 . We have P 1,x0 > P 1,x0 since P sd 1 P . Under a priority order of agent, if agent 1 gets y ∈ D such that x 0 y under R, x 0 is unavailable under R and R . Hence, there is a priority order 1 such that agent 1 gets x 0 under R and gets x 1 where x 1 x 0 under R, otherwise we have P 1,x1 ≤ P 1,x , a contradiction. If x 1 isn't the first bundle in , since P 1,x1 = P 1,x , there is a priority order 2 such that agent 1 gets x 1 under R and gets x 2 where x 2 x 1 under R. Continue the process until we find the first bundle
and there is no such priority order for x i . Hence, P 1,xi > P 1,xi , a contradiction with P sd 1 P . Therefore, P (1) = P (1).
Counterexample for Remark 1. Remark 1. MRP is not upper invariant and sd-strategyproof under general partial preferences.
Proof. Consider the case when N = {1, 2}, M = D 1 = {1 1 , 2 1 }, and R = { 1 , 2 } where 1 = ∅, 2 = {1 1 2 2 1 }. In MRP, the fixed topological orders are 1 1 2 1 for 1 and 1 1 2 1 for 2 . It is obvious that agents both get 0.5 1 1 and 0.5 2 1 under this situation. Let R = { 1 , 2 } where 1 = {2 1 1 1 1 }. Under R , agent 1 gets 2 1 and agent 2 gets 1 1 . Let P and P be the expected output of MRP. We don't have P sd 1 P . Hence, MRP is not sd-strategyproof under general partial preferences. 1 is an upper invariant transformation of 1 at 2 1 under P , but P 1,21 = P 1,21 . Hence, MRP is not upper invariant under general partial preferences.
Proof of Lemma 1. Lemma 1. Given any partial preference profile R and assignment matrix P , P is sd-efficient if P admits no generalized cycle at R.
Proof. By inversions, we assume that the assignment matrix P admits no generalized cycle at R and there exists another assignment matrix Q = P such that Q sd P . We try to find a generalized cycle in P . LetN = {j ∈ N : P (k) = Q(k)} andN = ∅ because Q = P . Let C be the set of all tuples (x,x) such that for some j ∈N , x jx and q j,x > p j,x , q j,x < p j,x . Because p j,x > q j,x ≥ 0, we have C ⊆ Imp(P ).
For any j ∈N , there exists x ∈ D such that q j,x = p j,x . If we have q j,x > p j,x for all q j,x = p j,x , we would have 1 = x∈D q j,x > x∈D p j,x = 1 which is a contradiction. Hence there exists x 0 ∈ D such that q j,x0 < p j,x0 . We have x∈U ( j ,x0) q j,x ≥ x∈U ( j ,x0) p j,x because Q P . Hence, there exists some x 1 ∈ D such that x 1 j x 0 and q j,x1 > p j,x1 , otherwise we induce a contradiction that x∈U ( k ,x0) q j,x < x∈U ( k ,x0) p j,x . Therefore, (x 1 , x 0 ) ∈ C and C = ∅.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that C is not a generalized cycle. Then there exists an item o such that for any x ∈ D containing o and there is x in some tuple in C, x is always the left component of any improvable tuple involving x. Obviously, we have q j,x = p j,x for any j / ∈N . Suppose there exists j ∈N such that q j,x < p j,x . Since x∈U ( j ,x) q j,x ≥ x∈U ( j ,x) p j,x , there exists somex ∈ D such thatx j x and q j,x > p j,x . Hence (x, x) ∈ C and x is the right component which is a contradiction to x is always the left component. Therefore, for any j ∈N , we have q j,x ≥ p j,x . Since x is the left component of some tuple in C, there exists j 1 ∈ N , such that q j1,x > p j1,x . Therefore 1 = j∈N,o∈x q j,x > j∈N,o∈x p j,x = 1, a contradiction.
Therefore for any tuple (x,x) ∈ C and o ∈ x, there is a tuple (ŷ, y) ∈ C such that o ∈ y. Hence C is a generalized cycle.
Proof of Theorem 2. Theorem 2. Given any partial preference profile R, MPS(R) is sd-efficient and weak-sd-envy-free.
Proof. (1) sd-efficiency. Suppose P is the output of MPS given any partial preference profile R. The proof involves showing P admits no generalized cycle, and therefore is sdefficient by Lemma 1.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that P admits a generalized cycle C. Let (x,x) be an arbitrary improvable tuple in C. Let Seq be the partial order on M which reflects the time when items are exhausted. Formally, for any pair of items o andô exhausted at times t andt during the execution of ESP respectively, if t ≤t, then o Seqô.
LetM be the set of items that are in some left components involved in C, and letô ∈M be one of top items according to Seq. By Definition 2, there is an improvable tuple (x,x) ∈ C such thatô ∈x. Since (x,x) ∈ Imp(P ), there exists an agent j ∈ N such that x jx and p j,x > 0. Hence when agent j starts to consumex, x is unavailable and there is an item o ∈ x such that o is unavailable when j starts to consumex. If we use t(o) and t(ô) to stand for the times when o andô exhausted in MPS respectively, we have t(o) ≤ t(ô) − p j,x < t(ô). Besides, since (x,x) ∈ C, we have o ∈M , a contradiction to thatô is one of top items according to Seq inM .
(2) weak-sd-envy-freeness. Suppose P is the output of MPS given any partial preference profile R. W.l.o.g we only prove the case for agent 1 and agent 2, that is if P (2) sd 1 P (1), then P (1) = P (2).
Suppose P (2) sd 1 P (1). Suppose the topological order of agent 1's preference in MPS is x 1 x 2 ... x n p . There exists 0 = t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n p = 1 such that for any i ≤ n p , if p 1,xi > 0, t i > t i−1 and t i is the time when x i is exhausted, else t i = t i−1 and x i is unavailable at t i .
At the beginning, any bundle is available. Hence, p 1,x1 > 0 and agent 1 starts to consume x 1 at t 0 = 0 till x 1 is exhausted. That indicates p 1,x1 ≥ p 2,x1 . Since P (2) sd 1 P (1) and x 1 is the first bundle in the topological order over 1 , we have p 2,x1 =
. Therefore, p 1,x1 = p 2,x1 and agent 1 and agent 2 are both consuming x 1 in the whole interval of [t 0 , t 1 ).
Suppose for any i < k, p 1,xi = p 2,xi and agent 1 and agent 2 are both consuming the same bundle at any time in [t i−1 , t i ). We want to prove agent 1 and agent 2 are both consuming the same bundle at any time in
and agent 1 and agent 2 are both consuming x k in the whole interval of [t k−1 , t k ).
By induction, we have p 1,x k = p 2,x k for any k ≤ n p . Hence P (1) = P (2).
Counterexamples for Remark 2. Remark 2. MPS is not ex-post-efficient since its output may not be realizable when coming to multi-type resources. MPS is not ordinally fair, sd-envy-free and upper invariant under general partial preferences.
Proof. (1) MPS is not ex-post-efficient coming to multi-type resources. We consider a special case for partial preferences, CP-net preferences with the same dependency graph as shown in Figure 2 . We can induce that the preferences are 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 and 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 . MPS(R) is shown in matrix 4 which cannot be realized obviously. (2) MPS is not ordinally fair and sd-envy-free under general partial preferences. Consider the case when N = {1, 2}, M = D 1 = {1 1 , 2 1 }, and R = { 1 , 2 } where 1 = ∅, 2 = {1 1 2 2 1 }. In MPS, the fixed topological orders are 2 1 1 1 for 1 and 1 1 2 1 for 2 . It is obvious agent 1 gets 2 1 and agent 2 gets 1 2 . Let P = MPS(R). We have P 2,12 > 0 and x∈U ( 2,12 ) P 2,x > x∈U ( 1,12 ) P 1,x . Hence, MPS is not ordinally fair. We don't have P (1) sd 1 P (2). Hence, MPS is not sd-envy-free.
(3) MPS is not upper invariant under general partial preferences. The counterexample of upper invariance for MRP can be also an counterexample for MPS.
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 2. No mechanism can satisfy both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness under general partial preferences.
Proof. We just consider the case of the allocation of singletype items and it is easy to example in similar manner when p ≥ 2. Consider the case when N = {1, 2, 3}, M = D 1 = {1 1 , 2 1 , 3 1 }, and R = ( j ) j≤3 where 1 = {1 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 1 3 1 , 2 1 1 3 1 }, 2 = {3 1 2 2 1 , 3 1 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 1 1 }, and 3 = ∅. It is easy to conclude that matrix (5) is the only assignment matrix that agent 3 does not envy others under the concept of sd-envy-freeness. However, it is dominated by matrix (6). Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove the cases when agent 1 lies. Given any CP-profile R = ( j ) j≤n , let P be the expected output of MRP under R. For any CP-profile R = ( 1 , −1 ) where 1 is an upper invariant transformation of 1 at y ∈ D, let P be the expected output of MRP under R . Next, we prove that P j,y = P j,y for any j ≤ n by showing that given any priority order over agents, any agent gets y under R if and only if she gets y under R.
Since the preferences of other agents keep same, given , the sets of available bundles are same in agent 1's turn under R and R . Suppose D ⊆ D is the set of all available bundles in agent 1's turn in MRP under R and R . Suppose agent 1 gets x ∈ D under R and x ∈ D under R . By Proposition 1, x 1 z for any z = x ∈ D and x 1 z for any z = x ∈ D . Given , we divide all situations to two cases, y ∈ D and y / ∈ D . Case 1, y ∈ D . We have x ∈ U ( 1 , y) and x ∈ U ( 1 , y). Since P 1,x > 0, we have x ∈ U ( 1 , y) by the definition of upper invariant transformation. If x = x , we have x 1 x and x 1 x which is a contradiction to the definition of upper invariant transformation where y) . Hence, x = x and agent 1 gets x under R and R . Therefore, all agents get the same bundles under R and R in this case.
Case 2, y / ∈ D . Agents after agent 1 in and agent 1 get no y both under R and R . Besides, agents before agent 1 in get the same bundles under R and R . Hence, one agent gets y under R if and only if she gets y under R in this case.
To sum up the two cases, given any priority order over agents, any agent gets y under R if and only if she gets y under R. Therefore, P j,y = P j,y for any j ≤ n.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Given any CP-profile R, MPS(R) is upper invariant for any other CP-profile R .
Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove the cases when agent 1 lies. Given any CP-profile R = ( j ) j≤n and any CP-profile R = ( 1 , −1 ) where 1 is an upper invariant transformation of 1 at y ∈ D, let P = MPS(R) and P = MPS(R ).
LetD = {x ∈ D : P 1,x > 0} andn = |D|. By Proposition 1, we have an order overD such that x 1 1 x 2 1 · · · 1 xn, x i ∈D for any i ≤n. There is x i0 such that under R, when agent 1 starts to consume x i0 , y is available and after x i0 is exhausted, y is unavailable. Suppose t i is the time when x i is exhausted for i ≤n under R. Let t 0 = 0. Next, we prove that the consumption processes of all agents are same before t i0 under R and R by induction.
Suppose before t k (k < i 0 ), the consumption processes of all agents are same under R and R (That is true for k = 0). Hence, the remaining resources are same under R and R at t k . If agent 1 turns to consume x k+1 under R at t k , the consumption processes are same between t k and t k+1 because the preferences of the other agents are same under R and R . Next, we prove that x k+1 is the exact bundle agent 1 turns to at t k . Suppose D ⊆ D is the set of all available bundle at t k under R and R . By Proposition 1, x k+1 1x for anŷ x = x k+1 ∈ D . As the same reason, there is x ∈ D such that x 1x for anyx = x ∈ D . Since k < i 0 , y is available at t k . Hence, x k+1 ∈ U ( 1 , y) and x ∈ U ( 1 , y). Since P 1,x k+1 > 0, we have x k+1 ∈ U ( 1 , y) by the definition of upper invariant transformation. If x = x k+1 , we have x 1 x k+1 and x k+1 1 x which is a contradiction to the definition of upper invariant transformation where y) . Hence, x = x k+1 , agent 1 turns to x k+1 at t k under R and the consumption processes are same between t k and t k+1 under R and R .
By induction, the consumption processes of all agents are same before t i0 under R and R . Hence, the consumption processes are same until y is exhausted. Hence, P j,y = P j,y for any j ≤ n.
Counterexample for Remark 3.
Remark 3. MPS is not weak-sd-strategyproof under CP-net preferences.
Proof. Consider the case when N = {1, 2}, M = {1 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 2 2 }. The CP-net preference of agent 1 is shown as (a) and (b) in Figure 3 while agent 2's is shown as (c) and (d). We can induce that 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 and 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 . If agent 1 doesn't lie, she will get 0.5 1 1 1 2 , 0.25 2 1 2 2 , and 0.25 2 1 1 2 in MPS. But if she lies about her dependency graph as (c) in Figure 3 and her CPTs as (e), her preference becomes 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 and she will get 0.5 2 1 2 2 and 0.5 1 1 1 2 in MPS, a better result for him. Proposition 5. Given any CP-profile R with a identical dependency graph, MPS(R) is weak-sd-strategyproof for any other CP-profile R with the same dependency graph.
Proof. W.l.o.g we only prove that it is unprofitable for agent 1 to lie. Given any CP-profile R with a identical dependency graph, suppose agent 1 misreports his preferences as 1 . Let R = ( 1 , −1 ) shch that R is also CP-profile with the same dependency graph. Let P = MPS(R) and P = MPS(R ). Suppose P sd 1 P . Our aim is to prove that P (1) = P (1). For any y ∈ S , S ⊆ T , we define U ( , y) = {ŷ : (ŷ, z) (y, z), ∀z ∈ −S orŷ = y}. We use An(D i ) to denote the set of types corresponding to the ancestors of D i in the dependency graph. Since each x ∈ P a(Di) corresponds to a linear order over D i in CP T (D i ), each y ∈ An(Di) does as well and we use y to denote the order. Before the main body of the proof, we list three claims about CP-net for convenience. Claim 1. Given any acyclic CP-net , for any
For any x ∈ S , and x ∈ S , if there are some y ∈ −S ,ŷ ∈ −S such that (x, y) (x,ŷ), then we have x ∈ U ( ,x).
Proof: We only prove the claim when S = An(D i ) since the proof when S = An(D i ) ∪ D i is similar. Given any acyclic CP-net , for any x ∈ S ,x ∈ S , suppose there are some y ∈ −S ,ŷ ∈ −S such that (x, y) (x,ŷ). Then there exists one path from (x, y) to (x,ŷ) in the preference graph of . Suppose the path is (x 1 , y 1 ) (x 2 , y 2 ) · · · (x t , y t ) such that x 1 = x, y 1 = y, x t =x, y t =ŷ, and only one pair of items is different between (x k , y k ) and (x k+1 , y k+1 ) for any k < t. For any z ∈ −S , we try to find a path from (x, z) to (x, z) by referring the path from (x, y) to (x,ŷ). Let E = ∅. For any k < t, suppose the different items between (x k , y k ) and (x k+1 , y k+1 ) belong to
. Add the edge between x k z and x k+1 z to E. It is obvious that all edges in E make up the path from xz toxz. Therefore xz xz for any z ∈ −S , that is x ∈ U ( ,x).
Claim 2. Given any CP-profile R and two assignment matrices Q and P , for any D i ∈ T and j ≤ n, let
Proof: Given any CP-profile R and two assignment matrices Q and P , for any D i ∈ T and j ≤ n, we only prove the case when S j = An(D i ) since the other case can be prove in like manner. Let S j = An(D i ) and suppose Q sd j P . For any S ⊆ T , D ∈ S, and x ∈ S , we define function
For any x 0 ∈ Sj , we select a special bundle y 0 by follow steps.
Select items for y
o ∈ x 0 } and k = 1.
If there exists no
and k = k + 1. Repeat this step again.
Since any j is an acyclic CP-net,Ŝ = T when we stop our selection for y 0 . Hence,
In like manner, we have
Claim 3. Under MPS, given any CP-profile R, for any
Then there exists x 1 j x 2 j · · · j x l and 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t l = 1 such that x k ∈ S , t k is the time when x k is exhausted and agent j starts to consume x j at t j−1 for j ≤ l.
Proof: By Proposition 1, at the beginning of MPS, agent j starts to consume her unique favorite bundle y 1 ∈ D. Let x 1 ∈ S such that any item in x 1 is an item in y 1 . Since P j,y1 > 0, we have 0 = t 0 < t 1 . Let m = 2, then we find x k and t k (k = 2, 3, ..., l) in the loop of k. Suppose agent j turns to consume y k+1 when she exhausts y k (k = 1, 2, ..., l − 1 and when y l is exhausted, MPS ends). By Proposition 1, we have y k j y k+1 . Letx k ,x k+1 ∈ S such that any item inx k is an item in y k and any item inx k+1 is an item in y k+1 . By Claim 1, we havex k =x k+1 orx k jxk+1 . If x k jxk+1 , let x m =x k+1 , t m be the time when y k is exhausted and add m by 1. Now, we begin the main body of the proof. Under CPprofile R with a share dependency graph, let S(j, t, D i ) be the bundle x ∈ An(Di)∪Di that agent j is consuming at t. Let t(o) for any o ∈ M be the time when o is exhausted, N (o, t) be the set of agents who are consuming o at t and n(o, t) = |N (o, t)|. We have t(o) = sup{t : n(o, t) ≥ 1}. Under R , we can define S (j, t, D i ), N (a, t) and n (a, t) in a similar way.
The main idea of the proof is to prove a stronger conclusion than P 1 = P 1 that S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ n, t ∈ [1, 0) and D i ∈ T . To achieve that, we prove
For any D i ∈ T and P a(D i ) = ∅, by Claim 3, there ex-
Suppose for any j ≤ n, m < k, and t ∈ [t m−1 , t m ), we have S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ). That is true for k = 1. Next we prove S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any t ∈ [0, 1) by induction on k.
We claim that there exists no o
.., o k−1 }, and P 1,o > 0. Otherwise, since S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, t k−1 ), o is available at t k−1 but o 1 o k and agent 1 starts to consume o k at t k−1 , a contradiction. Therefore, by P sd P
and Claim 2, we have k m=1 P 1,om = o∈U ( 1,ok ) P 1,o ≥ o∈U ( 1,ok ) P 1,o = k m=1 P 1,om . By the inductive assumption, we have P 1,om = P 1,om for any m < k. Hence, P 1,o k ≥ P 1,o k . Agent 1 is consuming o k during the whole interval [t k−1 , t(o k )) under R but during the sub interval of [t k−1 , t (o k )) under R . Therefore, t(o k ) ≤ t (o k ).
We claim that for all t ∈ [0, t(o k )) and all agents j, j = 1, we have:
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is an agent j, j = 1, and a time t, 0 ≤ t < t(o k ) such that j ∈ N (o k , t) and j ∈ N (ô 1 , t), for some itemô 1 = o k ∈ D i . As t < t(o k ) ≤ t (o k ), o k is available at time t under R and o 1 j o k (because the preferences of agent j are same under R and R ). Soô 1 is unavailable at t under R. This says t(ô 1 ) ≤ t < t (ô 1 ). Let A = {o ∈ D i : o = o k ∧ t(o) < t (o)}, we haveô 1 ∈ A and A = ∅. We pickô 2 in A such that t(ô 2 ) = min{t(o) : o ∈ A}. Note that t(ô 2 ) < t(o k ) because t(ô 1 ) < t(o k ) andô 1 ∈ A.
We claim that at some t < t(ô 2 ), there is an agentĵ such thatĵ ∈ N (ô 2 , t) andĵ / ∈ N (ô 2 , t). Otherwise we have N (ô 2 , t) ⊆ N (ô 2 , t) for t ∈ [0, t(ô 2 )). And there is some sub interval of [t(ô 2 ), t (ô 2 )) such that n (ô 2 , t) ≥ 1 for any t in the sub interval since t (ô 2 ) = sup{t : n (ô 2 , t) ≥ 1}. Hence t(ô2) 0 n(ô 2 , t)dt < t (ô2) 0 n (ô 2 , t)dt,
a contradiction with t(ô2) 0 n(ô 2 , t)dt = 1 = t (ô2) 0 n (ô 2 , t)dt.
Note thatĵ = 1 because agent 1 is consuming o k during [t k−1 , t(o k )) under R. Supposeĵ ∈ N (ô 2 , t) andĵ ∈ N (ô 3 , t), for some t < t(ô 2 ) andô 3 ∈ D i . Asô 2 is available at t under R (because t < t(ô 2 ) < t (ô 2 )), we havê o 3 ĵô2 . Henceô 3 is unavailable at t under R (ĵ = 1 and her preferences are same under R and R ). Therefore, t(ô 3 ) < t < t (ô 3 ) and t(ô 3 ) < t < t(ô 2 ), a contradiction with t(ô 2 ) = min{t(o) : o ∈ A}. Thus we have shown N (o k , t) ⊆ N (o k , t) for t ∈ [0, t(o k )). If t(o k ) < t (o k ), we would have a contradiction like (8) and (9). Hence t(o k ) = t (o k ) = t k . Since P 1,o k ≥ P 1,o k and P 1,o k = t(o k ) − t k−1 , agent a is consuming o k during the whole interval [t k−1 , t (o k )) under R and P 1,o k = P 1,o k . Since the preferences of all agents except agent 1 keep same under R and R , S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ∈ N and t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ).
By induction, we have S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ N , any t ∈ [0, 1), any D i ∈ T such that P a(D i ) = ∅. Now, we consider D i ∈ T such that P a(D i ) = ∅. We prove S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any D i ∈ T , j ≤ n and t ∈ [0, 1) by induction on D i .
Suppose for any Dî ∈ An(D i ), j ≤ n and t ∈ [0, 1), we have S(j, t, Dî) = S (j, t, Dî).
(10) For convenience, we use xo ∈ An(Di)∪{Di} to denote some y ∈ An(Di)∪{Di} such that x ∈ An(Di) and o ∈ D i . By Claim 3, under R, there exists x 1 o 1 1 x 2 o 2 1 · · · 1 x l o l and 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t l = 1 such that x k ∈ An(Di) , o k ∈ D i (k ≤ l), P 1,xo = 0 for any xo / ∈ {x 1 o 1 , x 2 o 2 , ..., x l o l } and agent 1 is consuming o k during the whole interval [t k−1 , t k ).
Suppose for any j ≤ n, any m < k, any t ∈ [t m−1 , t m ), we have S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ). That is true for k = 1. We prove S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any t ∈ [1, 0) by induction on k.
In like manner above, we have P 1,x k o k ≥ P 1,x k o k . Agent 1 is consuming x k o k during the whole interval [t k−1 , t(o k )) under R but during the sub interval of [t k−1 , t (o k )) under R .
If k = l or x k = x k+1 , by inductive assumption (10), agent 1 has no chance to consum x k after t k and P 1,x k = P 1,x k . Hence we have P 1,x k o k = P 1,x k − m<k,xm=x k P 1,xmom = P 1,x k − m<k,um=x k P 1,xmom ≥ P 1,x k o k . Hence, P 1,x k o k = P 1,x k o k and S(1, t, D i ) = S (1, t, D i ) = o k for any t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ). Besides, we have S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ n and t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ) since the preferences of other agents keep same under R (Preferences over P a(Di)∪{Di} only depend on the items in P a(D i ) ∪ {D i } as R is CP-profile with a identical dependency graph).
If k = l and x k = x k+1 , o k is exhausted at t k and t(o k ) = t k . We claim that for all t ∈ [0, t(o k )) and all agents j, j = 1, we have:
By inductive assumption (10), for any j ∈ N , agent j are consuming some x ∈ An(Di) at any t ∈ [0, 1) under R and R . For any j = 1, t ∈ [0, 1), suppose agent j is consuming x ∈ An(Di) , under R and R . For anyô 1 ,ô 2 ∈ D i , if j ∈ N (ô 1 , t), j ∈ N (ô 2 , t) and t(ô 1 ) ≤ t (ô 1 ), we have xô 2 ∈ U ( j , xô 1 ) by Claim 1 since xô 1 is available at t under R . Thenô 2 is unavailable at t under R since j ∈ N (ô 1 , t). Hence we can conclude that if j ∈ N (ô 1 , t), j ∈ N (ô 2 , t) and t(ô 1 ) ≤ t (ô 1 ), we have t(ô 2 ) < t(ô 1 ) and t(ô 2 ) < t (ô 2 ). Therefore, in like manner of the proof in (7), we can prove our claim (11). We have the conclusion that N (o k , t) ⊆ N (o k , t) for t ∈ [0, t(o k )) by claim (11). In like manner, we can prove that S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ n and t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ).
By induction on k, we have S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, 1).
By induction on D i , we have S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, 1), D i ∈ T and P a(D i ) = ∅.
To sum up, we have prove that S(j, t, D i ) = S (j, t, D i ) for any j ≤ n, t ∈ [0, 1), D i ∈ T . Therefore, P 1,y = P 1,y for any y ∈ D.
